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Abstract
Agriculture is inherently risky. Drought is a particularly troublesome hazard that has a documented adverse impact on
agricultural development. A long history of decision-support tools have been developed to try and help farmers or policy
makers manage risk. We offer site-specific drought insurance methodology as a significant addition to this process. Drought
insurance works by encapsulating the best available scientific estimate of drought probability and severity at a site within a
single number- the insurance premium, which is offered by insurers to insurable parties in a transparent risk-sharing
agreement. The proposed method is demonstrated in a case study for dry beans in Nicaragua.
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Introduction
Agriculture is inherently risky, a review of rural poverty
identified exposure to risk as a major modifiable reason for
chronic poverty, noting the widespread evidence that correlates
risk with poverty [1]. Production risks include, but are not limited
to climatic hazard, which of all the hazards agriculture faces is
perhaps the most difficult one for agriculturalists to manage.
Drought is the most serious of the natural hazards globally in
terms of loss of life, accounting for 44% of reported deaths in the
period 1974–2003 [2].
The mere expectation of drought is sufficient in some cases to
reduce agricultural production. Nearly 80% of farmers inter-
viewed in Ethiopia cited harvest failure caused by drought and
other natural hazards as the event that caused them most concern
[3]. Pandey et al. [4] revealed a huge drop in income for rice
farmers in Orissa state in India as a result of drought. The impacts
of drought extend beyond the loss of production. Sakurai and
Reardon [5] include increases in local interest rates due to a rise in
households seeking credit, a decline in farm labor demand, a
reduction in local wages due to greater numbers seeking off-farm
employment, drops in livestock prices due to distress sales of
livestock and increases in food prices coinciding with low financial
resources.
Additionally to the risk drought prone farmers face there is
growing interest for weather insurance schemes for poor farmers to
balance their risk as shown in a recent studies in Africa [6] and
China [7]. Insurance schemes have been developed, for example,
for east Africa [8] and Central America [9]. The reasons for the
low uptake of index-based insurance schemes that is cited in the
literature is the lack of understanding of the core concepts [6], and
the lack of trust in the schemes and in insurance companies
[10,11]. An additional hindrance for wider uptake may be the low
spatial resolution of climate data and lack of suitable crop yield
data, which leads to high basis risk, which the farmers assume, and
which makes the insurance unattractive for farmers. It is this
aspect that we address in this study.
In this paper we introduce index rainfall insurance methodology
as a tool that can help smallholder farmers manage the risk of
drought. We then briefly recapitulate on a previous paper [12]
where we looked at the possibility of using a weather generator to
provide data to simulate crop yields used to design an indexed
rainfall insurance instrument for smallholder drybean growers in
Honduras. We then extend the method to determine the
probabilities of damaging drought over the area in the north-
central mountains of Nicaragua where drybeans are the main food
crop. We finally discuss the need for insurance instruments that
reduce basis risk by taking account of site specificity, crop variety
and soil to design crop insurance instruments with emphasis on
smallholder farmers.
1. Drought, Risk and Smallholder Farmers
Aside from drought, farmers face other environmental hazards
such as hail, floods and frosts. In the north-central mountains of
Nicaragua, where most of the drybeans are produced as a food
staple by smallholder farmers, drought is by far the most common
hazard and according to climate predictions it is going to get even
dryer in the future [13]. Flood rains from tropical hurricanes do
occur of course, but much less frequently than drought. Hail is
rare and frost at altitudes lower than 1200 m does not occur at this
latitude.
Drought is an especially serious problem for small-scale
producers, most of whom do not have access to irrigation. For
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e38281example, in Nicaragua only 8% of the land is irrigated [14], and
almost none of this is in the central-north region where bean
growers are located.
Droughts cause food and income insecurity through both acute
effects and chronic secondary effects. Acute effects are immediate
crop failure, which in extreme cases leads to hunger and even
starvation. Secondary consequences of drought include increases
in local rates of interest due to an increase in the number of
households seeking credit and a decline in the demand for farm
labor leading to a reduction in local wages due to greater numbers
seeking off-farm employment. Livestock also suffer hunger and
starvation leading to falling prices due to distress sales. Food prices
increase coincidental with falling financial resources available to
rural households as sources of income dry up [5].
The rural poor are often, indeed usually, found on lands that
are marginal for one reason or another, such as low fertility soils,
steep slopes and remoteness. They are especially vulnerable to
drought. Large numbers of people are affected. Numerous studies
have shown a strong link between risk, vulnerability and poverty
[3,15,16,17]. Poor households lack resources with which to absorb
the shocks of natural hazards.
Even small disruptions in the flow of income can have serious
implications for them, so poor farmers commonly use informal
and self-insurance measures to avoid risk. As discussed in more
detail below, while these measures can help survival (e.g. [18]),
most studies conclude that they are not the most effective tools for
risk management, since they reduce the impact of a hazard at the
expense of more profitable activities [19,20,21]. Although any risk-
management strategy has a cost, the poor often have no other
options besides informal methods because insurance is rarely
available to them. If the insurance is more attractive than the
informal methods, our consultations with smallholders in Nicara-
gua suggests that they would welcome the opportunity to
participate.
2. Risk and Insurance
2.1 Strategies for coping with risk and their effects on
livelihoods. Most of the modern measures to mitigate risk are
not readily available in developing countries, hence farmers in
these regions are obliged to adopt traditional informal risk coping
mechanisms [22] (Table 1).
The implicit costs associated with informal strategies can be
quite high [15], which many argue are a barrier to poverty
alleviation and indeed reinforce poverty [21,23]. If it were possible
to accomplish the same risk reduction or risk transfer at lower cost
using formal insurance, then this could increase household profits
and reduce poverty. Traditional risk-coping mechanisms are also
risk-averse strategies that use resources inefficiently and fail to
exploit more productive investments and technologies that in the
long term would result in more productive systems [14,24]. For
example, when faced with the possibility of losing an entire crop
due to drought, farmers may lessen risk by minimizing investment
in the crop by not applying fertilizer. They do this because making
the additional investment increases their loss should the crop fail.
2.2 Risk sharing through insurance is an option but has
traditionally not been available to the poor. Formal
insurance has provided benefits to individual consumers for
centuries and in the last few years has also been suggested as a pro-
poor tool for managing risk [25]. A growing number of micro-
insurance products (products offered to insure items in the range of
a few hundreds of dollars) are now being offered in poor countries
in the areas of life, health and property insurance and in some
cases, schemes for crop insurance. This growing interest in micro-
insurance products as development tools is associated with the
expansion of micro-credit schemes [20]. There is also a growing
recognition of the mutual benefits of risk management as a tool for
poverty alleviation. Micro-insurance is not only justified on the
basis of humanitarian need.
Insurance can be thought of as exchanging the irregular
uncertainty of large losses for regular small premium payments. A
general rule of thumb seems to be that the larger the proportional
loss in assets and income to the household, the fewer alternatives
there are to recover from the loss [23]. Insurance is one of the few
viable options for poor people to manage uncertain events that can
cause large losses.
2.3 Previous experience with insurance has not been
good. Although we have made the case for crop insurance
above, crop-insurance schemes in general in the tropics have a
sorry record [26]. Several governments have developed crop
insurance schemes. To date, most agricultural insurance has been
either fully publicly owned or has involved large government
subsidies to schemes operated by private companies. Unfortu-
nately most of them have failed.
The main reason for failure of publicly-owned insurance
schemes is because they were either multiple-peril or all-risk
programs [26]. This means that virtually any cause of crop failure
has been insured, which results in moral hazard where there is no
incentive for the insured to use the best possible practices to avoid
yield loss. Moreover, risks are widely correlated or systemic, that is
a weather risk event affects many crops at the same time over an
extensive geographic area [27]. Further problems are adverse
Table 1. Risk management tools.
Self insurance measures Modern risk avoidance measures
Crop diversification Production contracting
Maintaining financial reserves Marketing contracting
Reliance on off-farm employment Forward pricing
Other off-farm income generation Futures options contracts
Selling family assets (e.g. cattle) Leasing inputs
Avoidance of investments in expensive processes such as fertilizing
(especially in high-risk years)
Invest in fertilizer, use long-term forecasts
Accumulation of stocks in good years Acquiring crop and revenue insurance
Removal of children from education to work on farm Custom hiring
(Source: Wenner and Arias, 2003; Skees et al., 2001; Hess, 2003).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.t001
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and the high transaction costs associated with sales, underwriting
(to control adverse selection), and monitoring (to control moral
hazard). A benefit of index insurance is that there is no need to
underwrite each policy individually or to monitor for moral
hazard, which greatly reduce transaction costs. Nevertheless, there
are still sales costs, which are much proportionally much higher for
the small policies sold to smallholders.
The Nicaraguan Institute for Insurance and Reinsurance
(INISER) has developed a index insurance for groundnut
(http://sagropecuarios.org/guide.php?p=9). A regional risk and
vulnerability assessment was conducted to determine a unique
insured sum, premium and indemnization per region. The
INISER insurance scheme uses meteorological stations to
calculate a unique basis risk per region and a non-crop specific
algorithm to calculate the loss in yield due to a shortfall of
precipitation. This approach may have the limitation that the basis
risk is inadequately calculated in remote areas where there are few
data and details of crop management available.
2.4 Principles of weather insurance. Weather micro-
insurance has been proposed as a viable tool to help farmers
manage weather risk, which translates into crop production risk.
The principles behind weather insurance have been widely
discussed [26,28,29,30,31]. A review of the principles and
experience of the insurance processes follows.
A number of factors govern the viability of insurance. Risk-
sharing can only occur when both parties (the insurer and insured)
have accurate information about a hazard and its likelihood. This
has been the basis of insurance for over three centuries and Skees
[32] maintains that a sound weather insurance product is
transparent thus eliminating both moral hazard and adverse
selection. Risk sharing must be broad enough to overcome co-
variate risk (the risk that all crops insured in a scheme are affected),
given that major weather events typically have broad geographic
coverage. Many other factors are also important such as consumer
demand, data availability, acceptably low delivery costs, capacity
of local insurers, and an enabling legal and regulatory environ-
ment.
The probabilities of occurrence of adverse weather events that
reduce crop yield can usually be estimated from historical weather
data, provided that the available data captures the innate
variability of the weather. In developing countries, this is rarely
the case. Moreover, some areas are riskier than others. In an
insurance scheme the probability of occurrence must be identified
for specific areas and be agreed by both parties (symmetry of
information).
Insurance based on weather indices is a relatively recent
development, in which weather events, not yield, are the basis for
determining indemnity payment. Compared to area-average
indices, weather-based indices have the advantage that weather
data are generally more accessible and reliable than yield data.
This is especially the case in developing countries [32]. Weather-
related crop insurance products succeed or fail on their ability to
present accurate information about weather-related risks that are
specifically associated with yield loss. The critical step is to
identify the relationship between an insured weather event and
consequent crop loss. There are those who argue that more
generalized weather indices should be developed that can be
used to protect households from the variety of losses that occur
due to extreme weather events [33,34,35,36], but we are not in a
position to consider all these many components. We restrict
ourselves to formulating approaches that might be useful to
smallholders to confront the loss of one or more key staple crops
due to unfavorable weather, rather than extreme weather events,
which are very different.
A key attribute of weather-based index insurance is its simplicity
and transparency, which makes them more attractive to global
insurance markets [37]. Weather-index insurance also provides a
hedge against the cause of the yield loss, rather than its cost, which
is the underlying concept of insurance against yield reduction. This
removes the need to estimate prices [26,38], a critical component
of many of the traditional yield-triggered insurance schemes.
Results
1. Nicaragua Study Site
The main drybean-producing departments in Nicaragua are
Matagalpa, Jinotega, Estelı ´ and Nueva Segovia [41] in the north-
central mountains. Most drybeans are produced on hilly to steep
slopes [42].
For the baseline study, we chose San Dionisio, in Matagalpa
Department, which is one of the major drybean producing areas of
Nicaragua [43]. At San Dionisio drybeans and maize are generally
grown at altitudes 500–800 meters on steep slopes; 67% of the
area has slopes greater than 30%.
Nicaragua has a well-defined dry season from December to
May and a rainy season from June to November. The rainy season
is long enough to allow two successive crops to be grown known as
the primera and postrera, separated by a short drought that usually
occurs in July or August [44] called the canicula. Although the
primera and postrera cropping periods are well defined, the onset of
the rains is highly variable so that sowing date is of great
importance to make the best use of both the primera and the postrera
cropping periods.
The drybean varieties grown in Nicaragua are adapted to
temperatures of between 17 and 24uC [42] and have a life cycle of
60–75 days. Farmers generally prefer small- and medium-seeded
black and red types [45].
Temperature and solar radiation vary little during the growing
season for any particular site in Nicaragua; it is rainfall that has the
greatest climatic influence on drybean production. The optimum
rainfall is between 300 and 400 mm while Jaramillo [46] quoted
by Rios and Quiros [47] found that the maximum yields were
obtained with 400 mm precipitation distributed according to the
water requirements of the crop.
2. Methodology
We selected the 151 10-arc minute pixels that covered the
departments of Matagalpa, Jinotega, Estelı ´ and Nueva Segorvia
where drybeans are grown (Figure 1). We generated 99 years of
weather data in MarkSim using the coordinates of the geograph-
ical center of each pixel. For each pixel, we input these data into
the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer [40]
drybean model to simulate yields for the 99 years for eight generic
soils with textures ranging from sand to silty clay and either deep
or shallow profile from the DSSAT soil database. We used the
genetic coefficients for the variety Rabia de Gato, whose
physiological characteristics are similar to the traditional varieties
grown in the region. In total we simulated almost 120,000 separate
crops of drybeans.
For each soil within each pixel (called a ‘‘run’’), we established
the minimum water requirement (MWR, as rainfall) for each
dekad below which there was a yield reduction, We tabulated the
rainfall data for each dekad with the simulated yield and for each
dekad we estimated plausible values for the minimum MWR. We
subtracted these MWRs from the observed rainfall for each dekad
to calculate deficits, that is, we ignored positive values. The total
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the deficits. Note that the MWR is a simply a plausible starting
value, which is subsequently adjusted in the optimization
procedure in the next step.
We selected the lowest quartile of each run and calculated total
rainfall deficits from day 210 to day +70 for each simulation
within this subset. We then calculated the regression coefficient of
total deficit on crop yield. We optimized the estimates of MWR for
each dekad to maximize the correlation coefficient using the
Solver procedure of Excel with the constraint that MWR for each
dekad $0. The upper and middle quartiles of yield have rainfall
deficits of zero, and therefore were not relevant to establish
MWRs. We then calculated the rainfall index for each run as the
sum of the MWRs.
The procedure for the deep loam for the pixel BS (Figure 1),
which contains the locality of San Dionisio (12u 459,8 5 u 519W), is
summarized in Table 3.
3. Results
We applied the method to each soil-profile depth combination




2 0.7–0.9 and higher (Figure 2). Soil texture and
slopeaffectedtheR
2valuesbecausethereismorerunoffofrainfallon
the heavier soils and particularly on sloping land.
We used a range of generic soils with both deep and shallow
profiles. As expected, sandy soils were much droughtier than
heavier-textured soils and especially if they were shallow.
Using the relation of total rainfall deficit against yield we set
levels of deficit that would trigger an indemnity payout in a
hypothetical insurance instrument. The probabilities of reaching a
given level of deficit were then calculated for each of the eight soils
for each pixel. The probabilities of reaching deficits of 50 and
70 mm, averaged over all eight soils for simplicity, are presented in
Figure 3.
Based on these data, it was then straightforward to design an
insurance instrument for each soil within each pixel. The details of
a hypothetical contract are shown in Table 3. Tables 4 and 5 show
hypothetical growing seasons that do not reach, and do reach,
respectively, the trigger level. In designing an insurance instrument
based on modeling as described above, it is relatively simple matter
to obtain the information necessary for the actual soils in question
and adjust the index criteria accordingly.
This exercise shows that it is feasible for any given location to
simulate the yield of any particular crop for which there is a
simulation model in the DSSAT series.
Discussion
Sound insurance requires best estimates of hazard probability. It
also requires agreement about the likelihood of the hazard
occurring. Errors in estimation of the hazard can be due to three
sources:
N An incomplete model in which the weather event cannot be
related to the loss,
N (a) Spatial and (b) temporal variation in which the model is
complete, but data are incomplete, and
N Basis risk.
We discuss each of these as they apply to the Nicaragua case
study.
Figure 1. Two letter codes of each pixel used to identify the generated weather data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.g001
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Soil and Crop Cultivar
1.1 Soil specificity. The effectiveness of rainfall is strongly
influenced by soil characteristics. In soils that have low water-
storage capacity, the impact of rainfall shortages will be felt much
sooner than in the case of soils with high water-storage capacity.
Conversely, when soils are dry, small falls of rain can be more
effective on sandy soils compared with clay soils, which require
more water to ‘‘wet up’’. Soil texture, soil depth and water-holding
capacity are key factors to take into account in designing an
effective insurance scheme. Farmers growing crops on very risky
soils will need indemnity payments more often than farmers on less
risky soils, which must be reflected in both a soil-specific payout
structure and in the cost of the insurance coverage.
1.2 Cultivar specificity. Rainfall requirements will also vary
greatly from crop to crop and within the same crop depending on
the cultivar. Drought-tolerant varieties will naturally withstand
rainfall deficits more successfully than drought-sensitive varieties.
Therefore in order to improve the relationship between the rainfall
weather index and crop losses, the rainfall indices need to be
tailored specifically to the crop variety.
Table 2. Summary of main challenges that need to be addressed and possible areas of action.
Basis risk Details Solutions
Temporal risk The level of impact of a weather phenomenon will vary according to the
time at which it occurs during the crop cycle. E.g. a shortage of rainfall
at just before maturity may kill a crop, whereas just after seeding may have
little effect.
Indices that represent the temporal variability in
sensitivity to rainfall deficit.
Spatial risk A rainfall deficiency may occur at one location causing crop losses, but this
rainfall deficiency did not occur at the recording location and so no payment
is triggered.
Offset the risk by offering site-specific contracts that
account for spatial variability.
Crop specific risk A rainfall deficiency may kill a drought sensitive crop, whereas a drought
resistant crop will survive through longer periods of drought.
Offset the risk by tailoring the insurance to specific crops.
(Source: World Bank, 2001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.t002
Table 3. Sample insurance contract.
RAINFALL INSURANCE CONTRACT
REFERENCE WEATHER STATION (e.g.) San Dionisio INETER weather station
Crop (e.g.) Dry beans – drought tolerant type
Reference soil type (e.g.) Deep sand
Sowing window (e.g.) 15 May to 15 June
Sowing date rule (e.g.) First day after 5 consecutive rainy days over 5 mm each
Trigger value (e.g.) 270 mm
Premium price (e.g.) US$3
Indemnity (e.g.) US$5 for every mm of rainfall deficit after the trigger value
Minimum rainfall requirements (given crop and soil stated above)
Day 1 to 10 Day 11 to 20 Day 21 to 30Day 31 to 40 Day 41 to 50 Day 51 to 60 Day 61 to 70 Day 71 to 80 Day 80 to 90
MIN 0 10 10 25 40 40 40 30 0
RAIN
DEF
a. TOTAL Rainfall deficit
Calculation of indemnity payments:
1. MIN is the minimum rainfall that is required for your crop in each of the 10 day windows.
2. RAIN is the rainfall observed at the reference weather stations (you may enter this into the RAIN box, however it is the official rainfall recorded at the weather station
that determines whether you are entitled to an indemnity payment).
3. DEF is the rainfall deficit. This is calculated by subtracting MIN from RAIN (only negative values are taken into account).
4. Indemnity payments occur when the TOTAL rainfall deficit is equal to or less than the trigger value.
5. The rainfall deficit is the sum of the 10 day rainfall deficits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.t003
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coefficients must be known for the cultivar or cultivars in question.
Ideally these should be the outcome of carefully-designed
experiments. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some informed
guesses as to what the coefficients should be, based on
phenological data from different latitudes for the cultivar in
question. But the guessing should only be undertaken by experts
with a clear understanding of how the particular model represents
physiological factors such as photoperiod response and the
thermoregulation of plant development.
1. 3 Planting date. In rain-fed agriculture, which is implicit
in designing a drought index, sowing date varies from season to
season depending on the onset of rain at the start of the growing
season. Since weather insurance schemes will be sold in advance
when there is no information about what the weather will be, a
transparent system is needed that incorporates variable planting
dates into the insurance products. Both insurer and insured will
need to know the exact start and end dates within which the
observed rainfall will be taken into account for determining
indemnity payments. To maximize the effectiveness of the
insurance product, the method used to establish the sowing date
used in the product must reflect the actual planting date as closely
as possible.
2. Spatial Error
Crop yields from research stations are typically 30%, or more,
higher than those of farmers’ fields [48], so that using them as the
basis for estimating the effect of a given weather event on farmers’
yields is dangerous. Moreover, weather risk varies spatially. To
reflect this spatial variation of risk in the premium, methods to
estimate it in risk evaluation are needed so that the insured pays
the price of the risk they actually confront.
The spatial limitations of MarkSim’s weather surface, 2.5 arc
minutes for Asia (4 km near the Equator), 10 arc minutes
elsewhere (18 km), are now irrelevant with the availability of the
WorldClim surface [49]. WorldClim’s surface has a resolution of
30 arc seconds, or about 1 km at the Equator and it is a simple
procedure to extract data from it and use these as external input to
MarkSim. This permits further lessening of basis risk, in all but
extreme terrain, where it is unlikely that insurance would be
considered.
3. Temporal Error, Estimating Extreme Events from Short-
run Data
It is common to think that 50 years’ (or so) weather data is
sufficient to estimate yield variation in crops. We caution that this
is a dangerous assumption. Engineers design structures and other
works to withstand a given frequency of extreme weather, for
example, a river levy to withstand a one in 100 year flood, termed
more simply a 100-year flood. Clearly, a short run of historical
data (50 years or even less) is only a limited sample of a very large
population. Using such limited data alone to generate probabilities
of climate risk will lead to seriously under- or over-estimated risk
since by definition, only the extremes encompassed by the actual
data are represented.
A different component of temporal factors is some method of
incorporating the El Nin ˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenom-
enon. Recent studies have shown that the ENSO has a profound
effect on weather, not only in the eastern Pacific but more
generally globally. Although this may make long-term forecasts
more reliable, it is not yet clear how this can be applied in practical
terms. MarkSim does not attempt to identify the ENSO
phenomenon, although it does include its effect in the temporal
variation it represents.
No weather simulator will forecast extreme events, so the
method presented here will need to be modified to take account of
their historical frequency if that is deemed necessary [35]. As it
stands, the method does not address this issue. Typically, engineers
use a Pearson function (logarithmic extrapolation) based on
historical data, but consideration of this approach is outside the
scope of this paper.
4. Consequences of Basis Risk
As the checkered history of insurance shows, commercial
viability is essential to ensure a self-sustaining insurance process.
Viability of insurance is determined by the design of the insurance
process, which encourages risk-sharing on the basis of transparent
Figure 2. Correlation coefficients of total rainfall deficit and rainfall on yield of drybeans simulated by the DSSAT drybean model
on contrasting soils for a selection of sites in north-central Nicaragua. Soil textures are (a) sand, and (b) silty clay. The rainfall for each cell
was generated using the MarkSim procedure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.g002
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doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.g003
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probabilities. A key part of this agreement is the provision of
accurate estimates, and in this respect we have concerns about
potentially imprudent application of insurance. Insurance with
excessive basis risk will be expensive or, worse, may invoke moral
hazard since farmers will believe themselves to be protected
whereas in fact they are not.
Index-based schemes seem particularly vulnerable to basis risk,
since their prime attraction is cost reduction through insuring
weather events rather than actual inspectable loss. We discuss this
point in more detail in Diaz Nieto [12], but briefly the actuarial
component of the index instrument is calculated on the basis of the
data recorded at a particular meteorological station, which is also
where the current rainfall is measured on which a payout will be
assessed. Any gradient in the actual climate surface from the
station to a farmer’s fields constitutes basis risk, which is borne by the
farmer. Proponents of indexed insurance and assessments of
unsuccessful pilot schemes consistently ignore this, in the latter
case often expressing bewilderment that farmers are unwilling to
avail themselves of the offered instrument. We have seen no case
where the reasons for the farmers’ unwillingness to buy have been
disaggregated to include farmers’ perception of the suitability of
the instrument for their own farms.
We believe that basis risk is a key issue and minimizing it is a
major advantage of the scheme we propose here. There can be
as many insurance instruments as are necessary to provide
coverage that individual groups of farmers perceive to be
relevant to them as the procedures we describe here can
generate pseudo-historical data of both weather and crop yield
for any point for which they are needed. The only requirement
is that each will be required to have its own rain gauge on
which to determine any payout. In a successful scheme for
maize farmers in western Kenya in which we had some
involvement, cell-phone masts were the sites of choice for the
rain gauges, with the data being recorded in near-real time,
astonishingly, in Austria, from where it was readily available to
both the insurer and the insured.
5. Practical Implications: Technical Considerations in the
Design of an Effective Weather Insurance Scheme
A weather-index insurance scheme should ideally take into
account the following scientific and technical details:
5.1 Payable index. Several models, typified by the DSSAT
series, are available to simulate crop yield. The minimum
climatic variables required as key drivers are daily maximum
and minimum temperatures, solar radiation and rainfall. In
principle, such models could be used to determine whether
farmers receive an indemnity or not, by inputting the current
weather data into the model as they become available. Although
this approach is scientifically sound, it is unlikely to be thought
transparent by either the insured or the insurer. The
requirement of a weather index simply means that a complex
relationship between one climatic variable, such as rainfall in
the case of drought, and crop yield must be converted into a
simple index. Moreover, the index must be easily understood by
all parties so that the trigger event for an indemnity payment
and its magnitude is clearly defined.
5.2 Accurate estimation of payment
probabilities. Insurance companies will need to know how
often they will be paying out indemnities based on each of the
weather stations they are using as a reference for payments. In
some cases these weather stations will not have the necessary
historical data to determine this probability. A method therefore
needs to be established that will enable accurate estimation of the
probability at points where the historical data are inadequate or
lacking.
5.3 Weather insurance package or stand alone solution
crop solution. The kind of weather index method presented in
this paper is applicable to any crop included in DSSAT, which are
the main staple crops grown. Furthermore, the index developed
for any one component may be part of a broader insurance
package, which includes, for example, excessive precipitation and
other risks, or as a stand-alone solution. The type of instrument
offered will depend on the geographical location and the risks that
farmers there face.
Of course, the approach that we propose must be validated in
the real world, and we present it as a paradigm that can address
Table 4. Example of a season not entitled to an indemnity payment (total rainfall deficit does not reach the trigger value of
270 mm).
Day 1 to 10 Day 11 to 20 Day 21 to 30 Day 31 to 40 Day 41 to 50 Day 51 to 60 Day 61 to 70 Day 71 to 80 Day 80 to 90
MIN 0 1 01 02 54 04 04 03 00
RAIN 34.9 22.4 0.6 33.8 0 57.6 73.4 161.8 112.9
DEF 29.4 240
a. TOTAL Rainfall deficit 249.4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.t004
Table 5. Example of season resulting in an indemnity payment (total rainfall deficit exceeds the trigger value of –70mm).
Day 1 to 10 Day 11 to 20 Day 21 to 30 Day 31 to 40 Day 41 to 50 Day 51 to 60 Day 61 to 70 Day 71 to 80 Day 80 to 90
MIN 0 1 01 02 54 04 04 03 0 0
RAIN 5.8 3.6 0 9.5 4.1 23.5 12.6 2 96.1
DEF 26.4 210 215.5 235.9 216.5 227.4 228
a. TOTAL Rainfall deficit 2139.7
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038281.t005
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schemes. These validations can only be done in the future (unless
there is some trove of data of which we are not aware), with a well-
distributed set of weather stations and reliable data of farmers’
yields in the vicinity of each. A scheme in process by the Syngenta
Foundation in Kenya collects weather data in real time from
sensors on cellphone masts for farmers located in the coverage
area of the tower. Yield data from nearby farmers’ fields could
provide the validation that we seek over several years.
5.4 Methodological issues. We discussed the suitability of
the DSSAT models to formulate indices for crop weather
insurance in Diaz Nieto et al. [12], especially the criticism that
‘DSSAT results are calibrated to a very specific and idiosyncratic
situation’ [8]. We disagreed with this assessment, pointing out that,
‘far from a weakness, this is [DSSAT’s] great strength’. We argued
that DSSAT allowed us to reduce spatial risk in a ‘transparent and
logically consistent manner …, which is impossible in the statistical
approaches advocated by others.’ We went on to cast doubt on the
DSSAT modeling that Osgood et al. [8] did, concluding that, ‘In
our experience, the results that Osgood et al. [8] report are so bad
that we wonder whether the simulations were set up correctly.
Certainly DSSAT can give bad results if the models are not set up
with some basic understanding of crop agronomy.’
We note that Gianini et al. [9], in examining artificially-
generated weather for sites in Central America, used the WGEN
routine, which uses a first-order Markov model. As Jones and
Thornton [50] point out, first-order Markov simulates temperate
weather, which is controlled by a more-or-less orderly procession
of weather systems from west to east, relatively well, but it fails to
capture the very different synoptic situations of the tropics. Jones
and Thornton [50] showed that a third-order Markov model was
required to simulate the different patterns of rainfall in the tropics,
producing MarkSim [39], which we have used here. We urge
others to make use of this tool that more closely reflects the
behaviour of tropical systems.
No weather simulator will forecast extreme events, so the
method presented here will need to be modified to take account of
their historical frequency if that is deemed necessary [35]. As it
stands, the method does not address this issue. Typically, engineers
use a Pearson function (logarithmic extrapolation) based on
historical data, but consideration of this approach is outside the
scope of this paper.
The task of producing index insurance instruments for
smallholders anywhere in the tropics is frustrated by two realities:
there are few long-term sets of meteorological data (and let us not
even think about how reliable they might be), and data of farmers’
yields are similarly sparse and unreliable. Rather than treat the
problem as intractable and ignore the needs of smallholders that
conventional approaches regard as uninsurable, which most
insurers and especially reinsurers do, we propose an alternative.
MarkSim does reliably represent the climate variability in the
tropics, especially when combined with the WorldClim database at
1-km resolution. The DSSAT suite of crop models incorporates
understanding of crop physiology, biochemistry, and agronomy,
developed over more than 30 years and have been widely
documented in the literature over the last 30 years. Thus we feel
that it is realistic to combine modeled weather data extrapolated
from the best available meteorological data in combination with a
tested crop model to generate reasonable predictions of risk in
areas that are currently unserved by commercial approaches.
Conclusion
We present methods of providing low-cost, site-specific drought
insurance products for most crops in any location in the
tropics. We explain the benefit of insurance to risk takers, and
especially those with minimal resources, from which it should
become apparent that the major contribution this innovation
offers is that it streams best available science about natural hazards
directly to decision makers, through the medium of commercially-
viable insurance products. Insurance provides decision-support
to manage drought risk. The basis of the method, the insurance
premium, transmits the best-available estimate of drought
probabilities.
Estimates are only as accurate as the predictive model that
produces them and we reflect here on three sources of basis risk
that are likely to occur when modeling crop drought risk:
structural uncertainty of the model; spatial error and temporal
error. Structural uncertainty increases when the model fails to
represent processes that significantly influence drought risk. In this
respect, a model that depends solely on correlation between
rainfall and yield will not represent systematic and significant yield
variations that are caused by temperature, soil, crop variety or a
number of other factors.
Spatial error introduces a second major source of basis risk,
since it is rare that weather data, and even more so, yield data, are
available with sufficient density to enable simple interpolation over
large areas. Even where dense networks of weather stations exist
the degree of bias towards non-marginal sites is unknown, hence
its ability to represent higher risk in marginal areas. Thirdly, error
can occur due to unexplained temporal error caused by
inadequate data runs. A purely empirical estimation of low
probability events requires long runs of data.
We do caution that the method should not be applied
uncritically as illustrated by the effect of soil texture and slope
on soil water recharge, and the influence of temperature on
growth and hence yield at higher altitudes.
Methods
1. The Main Challenge in Developing Weather Insurance:
Basis Risk
The greatest challenge facing weather-based insurance products
is basis risk [14,26,32,37,38]. Basis risk occurs when the insurance
index does not accurately represent loss: a weather index may not
trigger a payment when there has indeed been a loss; or payment
may occur without serious loss. The insurance product will not be






others. A study by Diaz-Nieto et al. [12] using simulated data for
Honduras also revealed that a single weather index was not
appropriate for a country the size ofHonduras.
Basis risk is caused by the need to model complex heteroge-
neous systems within a single index. There are three sources of
basis risk (Table 2).
Specialized contracts can be designed to offset much of tem-
poral, spatial and crop-specific basis risk [37]. However, doing so
may increase administrative costs and, more importantly, increase
the complexity involved in marketing and distribution. An alter-
native to overcome basis risk is a larger number of standard con-
tracts that cover all possibilities and priced accordingly, and allow
the insured to select the contract they consider most appropriate
[38].
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the Rainfall Index
The fundamental requirement of a rainfall index is that rainfall
must explain a large proportion of the variability in yield
[26,30,32,38]. As a first step, it is essential to establish the cause
and effect relationship [38], so that the index represents critical
rainfall deficits that account for crop yield losses. It is not sufficient,
for example, to posit that a rainfall deficit of 30% of the long-term
average will trigger payment because this provides no information
about the timing of rainfall in relation to crop demands at different
growth stages.
Defining the weather events that cause the most serious yield
losses and that cover as many of the loss-causing events as possible
requires a considerable investment in research [26]. Furthermore
it is critically important that both parties agree that the weather
index adequately explains the variability in crop yields [30]. Few
customers would be inclined to purchase insurance that they did
believe protected them against risk.
3. Limited Availability of Yield and Climate Data on which
to Base Indices
Stoppa and Hess [30] suggested that to develop effective
weather-index insurance the weather variable must not only be
measurable but adequate historical weather records must be
available from which to estimate probabilities of a risk event
occurring and its magnitude. In spite of this, many of the feasibility
studies into the use of weather-based indices in developing
countries provide indices based on relatively few data. Reliable
long-term datasets of weather in developing countries are very
limited and this presents a major potential challenge. It is
noteworthy that countries with poor infrastructure are amongst
those places where an effective insurance product could have most
impact. The danger is that poor regions, which have greatest need
for insurance, are those which are excluded, precisely for reasons
of poor infrastructure associated with poverty.
An alternative approach, which we describe below, is to use
statistical models and process-based simulation models, based on
decades of scientific analysis, to generate ‘pseudo-historical’ data of
climate and yield. Where possible these pseudo-historical data can
be complemented with such weather data as are available.
4. Payout Index Highly Correlated with Yield Loss
In a weather insurance scheme it is not the actual crop loss that
is insured but the loss-causing event, which in this case is a
specified adverse weather event. Therefore the way in which the
relationship between weather and crop losses is expressed in an
insurance index needs to be carefully thought out and appropri-
ately designed. A producer will be interested in a weather-
insurance scheme that is highly likely to pay out when (s)he does
indeed suffer a crop loss. Ideally the relationship between weather
and crop yield can be extracted from long historical records of
both. In practice, as in the case of drybean yields in Nicaragua,
data are typically very scarce. It was therefore necessary to design
a methodology that allowed weather insurance to be developed in
these circumstances.
5. Summary of the Honduras Study
Dı ´az Nieto et al. [12] proposed a method for an indexed
insurance instrument for tropical sites for which historic data
were not available for either rainfall or crop yield. Briefly, they
combined the MarkSim weather generator [39] with the
drybean simulation of the DSSAT series of crop models [40]
for six sites in central Honduras. Because there was a low
frequency of drought for some of the sites, they randomly
imposed droughts for ten-day periods (dekads) during crop
growth. By comparing the simulated yields of the droughted
crops with those with no drought, they determined sensitivity
coefficients of the crop to drought at different stages of growth
for each site. Rainfall for each dekad of crop growth was
weighted by the crop sensitivity coefficient and the total
weighted rainfall was expressed as a percentage of the long
term mean. They selected an arbitrary ‘‘strike’’ value for each
site for years with rainfall deficit greater than 65%. They based
payout on the percentage deficit and calculated notional
premiums based on the frequency and amount of payout.
Because the north-central mountains of Nicaragua are drier
than the six sites in Honduras chosen by Dı ´az Nieto et al. [12], we
used a different method to determine the crop sensitivity
coefficients, described below.
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